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Abstract
One consequence of the EUs common agricultural policy was surplus: butter mountainsand wine lakes.
This paper shows that it may be optimal for the government to stockpile agricultural products as part of an
overall plan for income redistribution. If agricultural producers receive su¢ cient weight in the governments
social welfare function then a policy of price supports combined with government purchases of the resulting
surplus may be optimal.
Keywords: Price supports; Excess supply; Stockpiles; Optimal taxation
JEL classi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1 Introduction
In its heyday, Europes common agricultural policy (CAP) led to huge stockpiles of agricultural products.
Colorful terms like butter mountains and wine lakes were common. This policy appears wasteful.
However, it may actually be optimal, given the policymakerspreferences and the constraints that they face.
The idea is quite simple. Suppose agricultural producers receive much weight in the governments social
welfare function. This could be due to political reasons or any other social objectives. In this setting, the
government has an incentive to use its policy instruments to redistribute income in favor of this group. But
there may be obstacles that deter direct redistribution. For instance, it is generally accepted that lump sum
redistribution is not feasible. Also, the income tax is not suited for sector specic redistribution. So other
policy tools must be used, and price supports are a candidate. The government can use taxes and subsidies
to raise the relative price of agricultural products at the producer level. Presumably the government could
also use its policy instruments to manipulate consumer prices in such a way that these markets just clear.
But in a general equilibrium setting, any price distortion in one market can have feedback e¤ects in other
markets. Hence, there is no a priori reason to believe that the optimal policy is one in which all markets just
clear. It may be optimal to allow the private sector to produce more than it consumes, with the government
stepping in to purchase the surplus and simply store it in stockpiles. Ideally, one would like to see these
stockpiles put to good use. However, it may be impossible to achieve this through the price system because
of adverse general equilibrium e¤ects. Of course, there may be other policies that can e¤ectively put the
stockpiles to use (e.g., price discrimination through food vouchers for the poor, or dumping the surplus on
international markets), but that is beyond the focus of this paper. Here, the goal is simply to demonstrate
a set of circumstances under which stockpiles could be optimal.
Section 2 presents a simple general equilibrium example that illustrates the possibility described above.
The key feature is the following. The good in excess supply (agricultural output) is a consumption com-
plement, at the aggregate level, of other goods for which the market just clears. Under this assumption,
consider what happens if the consumer price of the agricultural product is lowered in an e¤ort to stimulate
demand, thus reducing the size of the stockpile: The demand for the complements also increases. This causes
demand to exceed supply for the complements, which cannot be an equilibrium. It may be possible to restore
equilibrium by adjusting other prices. But if the interactions between markets are su¢ ciently complex, then
all of these new equilibria may have lower social welfare than the original equilibrium. Under this scenario,
the stockpile is optimal.
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2 Example
There are four commodities: two types of specialized labor/leisure and two nal goods. Type ` labor is
used to produce good x. This is the agricultural sector. Type n labor is used to produce good y. This is
the manufacturing sector. Intermediate goods are not included in order to keep the analysis simple. Thus
goods x and y are consumed directly by households.
Production is organized as follows. Agricultural production is carried out by a single self-employed farmer.
Manufacturing, on the other hand, is carried out by one private sector rm that has constant returns to its
only input, factory labor. Thus there are no prots to be distributed to households. Labor is completely
specialized. That is, the farmer cannot provide labor for manufacturing, and factory workers cannot work
the land. This could be justied through a comparative advantage argument. The assumption that all
agricultural output is generated by household production is clearly unrealistic. However, a model with both
corporate farms and household farms would add little to the story.
There are only two consumers. One is the farmer. The other is a factory worker.
Consumer 1 (self-employed farmer) has the following utility function:
U1(`1; x1; y1) = 1 log `1 + log(minfx1; y1g)
which is written here as a function of consumption levels (not net demands). The assumption that x and y are
perfect complements is analytically convenient. The endowment is L1 units of labor/leisure. The technology
for producing agricultural output is as follows. One unit of labor yields one unit of good x. Let qx and
qy denote consumer prices, and let px be the producer price for food. (Then qx   px = tax, or subsidy if
negative.) The budget constraint is
qxx1 + qyy1  px(L1   `1):
This forces the farmer to sell all output through the market. This turns out to be an innocuous restriction
since production of x will be subsidized (px > qx). Thus, the farmer would rather sell all output then buy
x1 of it back, rather than bypass the market and eat x1 directly. The utility maximizing consumption levels
are
`1 =
1
1 + 1
L1; x1 = y1 =
1
1 + 1
px
qx + qy
L1
and the aggregate supply of food is X = L1   `1 = L1=(1 + 1). Indirect utility is V1 = log[px=(qx + qy)] +
constant.
Consumer 2 (factory worker) has the following utility function:
U2(n2; x2; y2) = 2 log(minfn2; x2g) + log y2:
The endowment is N2 units of labor/leisure. The budget constraint is
qxx2 + qyy2  qn( N2   n2):
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The utility maximizing consumption levels are
n2 = x2 =
2
1 + 2
qn
qn + qx
N2; y2 =
1
1 + 2
qn
qy
N2
and the aggregate supply of factory labor is N2 n2. Indirect utility is V2 = 2 log[qn=(qn+qx)]+log(qn=qy)+
constant.
The manufacturing rm can transform factory labor one-for-one into good y. Thus the production
constraint is Y  N2   n2. The direct social welfare function is W = U1 + U2.
The government solves an optimal taxation problem (e.g., Auerbach, 1985; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971;
and Mirrlees, 1986). Indirect social welfare is maximized subject to the weak inequalities for market clearing.
By WalrasLaw, the governments budget constraint is satised with equality. That is, the cost of buying
the surplus equals the net revenue from taxation:
px(X   x1   x2) = (pn   qn)( N2   n2) + (qx   px)(x1 + x2) + (qy   py)(y1 + y2):
This holds because both consumers satisfy their budget constraints with equality, the market for good y just
clears, and the manufacturing rm earns zero prots.
If the level of agricultural production leads to excess supply, the market clearing condition for good x
will not bind. Then the governments problem is to choose px, qx, qy, and qn to maximize V1 + V2 subject
to y1 + y2  Y  N2   n2 where the consumption quantities are given by the solutions to the consumers
problems. Given the structure of the example  in particular, the perfect complements and the constant
solution for `1  the governments problem can be written
maximize U1 + U2 =  log y1 + 2 log n2 + log y2 + constant
subject to y1 + y2 + n2  N2
where the choice variables are now the quantities y1, y2, and n2. The prices that support the optimal
allocation can then be inferred by inverting the consumersdemand functions.1 The solution is
y1 = x1 =

1 + + 2
N2; n2 = x2 =
2
1 + + 2
N2; y2 =
1
1 + + 2
N2:
(Recall that the perfect complements satisfy y1 = x1 and n2 = x2.) And from the farmers problem,
`1 = 1 L1=(1 + 1). With the normalization qx = 1, the optimal prices are
px = (1 + 1)

1 +

1 + + 2
 N2
L1
; qn =
1 + 2

; qy =
1 + + 2

:
Finally, we must conrm that this optimum indeed has excess supply in the market for good x, i.e.,
x1+x2 < X = L1  `1. Also, agricultural production must be subsidized: px > qx. After substitution, these
1This is just a change of variables. Rather than optimizing over the four nominal variables px, qx, qy , and qn, one can optimize
over the three real variables y1 = (1 + 1) 1 L1px=(qx + qy), y2 = (1 + 2) 1 N2qn=qy , and n2 = 2(1 + 2) 1 N2qn=(qn + qx).
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inequalities lead to the following parameter restrictions:
(1 + 1)

1  1
1 + + 2

<
L1
N2
< (1 + 1)

1 +

1 + + 2

:
It follows that there is an open set of parameter values for which agricultural stockpiles are optimal. In
particular, if the consumersparameters satisfy
1 + 1 <
L1
N2
< 2(1 + 1);
then stockpiles are optimal for all su¢ ciently large values of , i.e., for all su¢ ciently large welfare weights
on the farmer.
3 Discussion
The example is designed to be simple, but there is nothing pathological about it. For instance, it does not
violate the DiamondMirrlees (1971) production e¢ ciency theorem. Production here is e¢ cient; distribution
is not so e¢ cient. As a general matter, the optimal tax problem will select the most desirable allocation
from among those that are both productively feasible and market feasible (i.e., attainable through the price
system). The DiamondMirrlees theorem tells us that the optimum must lie on the frontier of the production
possibilities set. There are no further restrictions that tell us where on the frontier we will end up. Nor is
there any requirement that the production point must coincide with the consumption point. In the example,
the gap between the production and consumption of good x allows us to achieve a higher level of social
welfare. If we were to require this market to just clear, welfare would necessarily be lower (for the range of
parameter values indicated above).
One might object that the examples optimal tax problem has a producer price, px, among the choice
variables. Perhaps this drives the result? Standard optimal tax problems contain only consumer prices.
However, such an objection is not warranted. We can easily convert the example into the standard form and
get exactly the same result, optimal excess supply. The interpretation would be di¤erent but the analysis
would remain as above. Suppose the self-employed farmer is split into two separate economic entities: a farm
worker (consumer) and a farm (rm). The farm worker now earns labor income at the wage rate q`, while
the farm uses the one-for-one technology to transform farm labor into agricultural output. So q` replaces px
in consumer 1s problem, but all else remains the same. The drawback is that the example no longer tells a
story about agricultural price supports.
Consider the general form of an optimal tax problem. This may help shed some light on the example.
The governments choice variable is a vector of prices q, and perhaps also a head tax/subsidy T . The
objective is to maximize an indirect social welfare function W (q; T ) subject to a number of market clearing
conditions. If those conditions can be written as F1(q; T )  0, . . . , Fn(q; T )  0 with n > 1, then the
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DiamondMirrlees theorem tells us that at least one of these inequalities must bind; it does not tell us that
all of them must bind. And indeed, this is what happens in the example. More generally, whenever there
are specialized factors of production, it may be possible to express the market clearing conditions in this
way with n > 1. This opens up the possibility for optimal excess supply. Whether the possibility becomes
a reality depends on both private preferences (demand functions) and social preferences. The examples
demand complementarities and social welfare weights provide a combination that yields optimal stockpiles.
Other combinations are surely possible.2 A general set of conditions awaits future research.
2Guesnerie (1995, section 5.2.2) demonstrates that as the social welfare weights vary over all possible values, the set of
all optimal tax equilibria becomes large. If there are su¢ ciently many heterogeneous households, this set will generically be
a manifold with the same dimension as the frontier of the aggregate production possibilities set. If we also allow private
preferences to vary, this set will become an even larger part of the production frontier  larger than the set where all n of the
constraints Fi(q; T )  0 bind.
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